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RESUMEN
En este artı´culo se analizan algunos aspectos de la deuda soberana de
Ame´rica latina y el Caribe durante el perı´odo 1820-1913. Se examinan las
cuatro oleadas del auge crediticio y del movimiento de capitales que termi-
naron en episodios de defaults generalizados pero que no obstaculizaron a
priori sucesivos retornos al mercado de capitales en la mayorı´a de los casos
estudiados. A pesar de defaults que se extendieron en el tiempo, los paı´ses de
la regio´n atrajeron en cada oleada a una mayor cantidad de inversores
internacionales. A perı´odos de aislamiento del mercado de deuda soberana
se le suceden otros de una alta integracio´n con el mercado global medido por
el «premio» a pagar por el riesgo soberano o riesgo paı´s. Se discuten las
imperfecciones en el mercado de la deuda soberana; los aspectos macro y
microecono´micos y se discuten un menu´ de opciones que algunos de estos
paı´ses utilizaron para reestablecer el canal de fondeo internacional luego de
los defaults. El paralelismo con los vaivenes en el mercado de deuda
soberana contempora´nea en Ame´rica latina y el Caribe resulta sorprendente.
Palabras Clave: Deuda Pu´blica, Riesgo Soberano, Defaults Soberanos,
Reputacio´n, Flujo de Capitales, Crisis, Reestructuracio´n
1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we provide an analytic narrative that links theory and history to
give an account of Latin American sovereign debt from 1820 to 1913. We aim to
relate the course of events to both empirical evidence and currently influential
economic models of sovereign deft and default. Sovereign lending flows to Latin
America started right after independence and were on average quantitatively
large throughout the long 19th century. But the flows were also volatile, and
frequently subject to distress and default, with the borrower countries often
suffering economic hardships and lack of financial market access for extended
periods. Periods of exuberance with capital inflow bonanzas were often
followed by retrenchments or reversals, and history reveals four such waves
of capital ebbs and flows. Yet, after each crash, investors tended to return
even to economies that had started to serially default.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the history of sovereign
debt in the region for the entire period and notes the various key episodes and
peculiar characteristics of the market’s evolution. Section 3 brings in analytical
perspectives and forges links between the observed events and the various
prevailing economic theories of sovereign borrowing. Section 4 makes the link
to macroeconomic conditions and long-run growth and Section 5 focuses in
a more forensic fashion on certain key events that caused disruption in the
market, and asks what we can learn from those cases. Section 6 concludes.
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2. THE PUZZLING LATIN AMERICAN SOVEREIGN BOND
MARKET IN HISTORY
More than any other region, Latin America provides an expansive
historical experience on the contribution to economic development of
foreign capital in general, and sovereign debt in particular1. Latin America is
the only part of the formerly colonial periphery with two centuries of post-
independence historical experience. Once freed from Iberian rule, Latin
American countries rapidly embraced the use of global capital markets
to finance their public debt (and, increasingly, their private sectors too).
Previously, they had made no use of such tools. It is not inevitable the colonies
should be denied external financing from any source but their colonising
powers — as in the British Empire debt (especially from semi-autonomous
dominions) in the 19th century, when it was held by a variety of creditors. Yet
the combination of tight Iberian control and a financially immature global
market in the 1700s had foreclosed this option for Latin America.
Independence opened the door to external finance starting in the 1820s.
Over the next 100 years, foreign capital flows arrived in four great waves —
punctuated by defaults, crises, restructurings and periods of near autarky.
With the outbreak of World War I, the global bond market met an abrupt
end, and it would not restart for Latin American countries until the 1990s.
This section reviews the historical record of Latin American sovereign debt
from 1820 to 1913.
2.1. The first wave
In the 1820s, the new independent governments of Latin America
approached the burgeoning international capital markets of London and
Amsterdam, as shown in Table 1. Funding was sought to establish security
and infrastructure, and on a smaller scale the private sector went in search of
development finance. British investment dominated the first wave.
In 1822, government bond issues were floated by Colombia, Chile, and
Peru with a face value of £3.65 million; in 1824, there were new issues by
Colombia and Peru, plus Buenos Aires, Brazil and Mexico to the tune of
£10.4 million; and in 1825, Peru (yet again) plus Brazil, Mexico and Central
America issued bonds for a further £7.1 million. Sold at an average discount
of almost 25 per cent, these £21 million in government bonds realised on net
only £16 million for the borrowers. As investors soon discovered, these issues
were at best risky, at worst (in the case of the fictional Poyais) a fraud. When
fiscal burdens escalated with the wars of independence and subsequent civil
1 For a survey of foreign investment in the long run see Suter (1992). On Latin America, see
Taylor (2005).
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TABLE 1
DEFAULT HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT BONDS ISSUED
IN THE 1820S
Country
Principal
owed (£) Resolution, if any
Brazil 21,129,000 Arrears on interest paid and service resumed in 1829
Mexico 6,400,000 Refinancing in 1831 to cover principal and arrears on
interest. Quickly defaulted on. New refinancing in
1837. More defaults and refunding. Resolved 1864
Costa Rica 13,608 Inherited share of Central American confederation
debt. Principal paid off in 1840, but not arrears
on interest
Chile 1,000,000 Arrears on interest paid and service resumed in 1842
Peru 1,816,000 Arrears on interest paid and service resumed in 1849.
Default in 1876
Colombia (New
Granada)
3,375,000 Inherited 50% share of Gran Colombia debt.
Principal and arrears paid off by new loan in 1845.
Default in 1850. Principal and arrears paid off by
new loan in 1861
Venezuela 1,923,750 Inherited 28.5% share of Gran Colombia debt.
Principal and arrears paid off by new loan in 1841.
Default in 1847. New arrangements and further
defaults then follow
Ecuador 1,451,259 Inherited 21.5% share of Gran Colombia debt.
Principal paid off by new loan in 1855. Arrears
cancelled in exchange for land warrants and
Peruvian bonds. Default in 1868
Guatemala 68,741 Inherited share of Central American confederation
debt. Principal and arrears paid off by new loan in
1856
Buenos Aires 1,000,000 Resumed service in 1857
El Salvador 27,217 Inherited share of Central American confederation
debt. Paid off 90% of debt in 1860, but balance not
until 1877
Honduras 27,217 Inherited share of Central American confederation
debt. Principal and arrears paid off by new loan in
1867
Nicaragua 27,717 Inherited share of Central American confederation
debt. Paid off 85% of debt face value in 1874
Source: Rippy (1959, pp. 26-28).
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wars, a wave of defaults ensued, with all bond issues in default by 1827
(Rippy 1959, pp. 17–24; Stone 1977, p. 692; Marichal 1989, pp. 13–14).
New loans were not extended to the region until the defaults were
resolved and political and economic stability seemed more assured, a process
that took years and, in some cases, decades, as noted in Table 1. Of the
various 1820s sovereign issues that quickly failed, only Brazil, after a short
moratorium in 1826-1829 could avoid default, but most remained in default
for decades, with restructuring attempts frequently subject to failure as well
(de Paiva Abreu 2006). Here was a seemingly clear case where reputation
mattered: the bad debtors paid for their defaults by being excluded for a long
period from the financial markets2.
2.2. The second wave
Starting in the 1850s, there was a marked renewal of interest in Latin
America in the London capital markets. By 1880, these new investments had
accumulated into a sizeable stock that dwarfed the previous boom in the
1820s, and by then a total of £179 million was outstanding to Britain, £123
million in government bonds (69 per cent) and £56 million in private
enterprise debts (Table 2). The new surge was driven in part by a global trade
boom from the 1850s until the onset of the Great Depression of the 1870s.
More exports and imports meant more revenues (principally from customs
duties) that governments could use to amortise loans. These new debts
constituted a major increase in public borrowing and a test of the govern-
ments’ creditworthiness after decades of «financial hibernation». A total of
fifty major foreign loans were negotiated from 1850 to 1873, most in London,
and a few in Paris and other European markets (Marichal 1989).
But the extension of credit to sovereigns was more selective in the second
wave as compared with the first — investors avoided the riskier locations
and started to follow the signals given by the few countries that had shown
some dedication to debt service. With respect to sovereign loans, Brazil
had worked harder than other countries to honour debts and was duly
rewarded with the largest share of the new flows. Other countries took longer
to re-establish their creditworthiness. Argentina did not fully resolve internal
disputes and old debts until 1857, and only then did new loans appear.
Paraguay borrowed in London in 1871. Uruguay and Bolivia could do
likewise in 1872 (the first Bolivian issue in 1864 had failed). Chile floated
issues in 1858, 1865, 1866, 1867, 1870 and 1873 totalling £8.5 million. Costa
Rica, Guatemala and Honduras all issued non-refinancing debt (new net
inflows) in the peak of the investment boom from 1867 to 1872 (Rippy 1959;
Marichal 1989).
2 On default, punishments, and reputation, see Lindert and Morton (1989) and Tomz (2001).
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As might be expected, risk premiums paid by countries varied over a wide
range. Good risks like Brazil or Chile could float loans with 5 per cent cou-
pons at a price of 80 or 90, for a yield under 6 per cent. The exceptionalism
of the Peruvian case also deserves mention. As stated by Vizcarra (2009),
Peru’s experience with sovereign debt was an unusual case where, in spite of
ongoing political instability and a poor capital market reputation, due to the
enormous guano boom, whose large export proceeds served as a quasi-
backstop to national solvency, the country was accorded a low credit risk
until the 1870s (Vizcarra 2009). Argentine coupons ran to 6 or 7 per cent, and
the issues sold at around 90. Costa Rica floated 6s and 7s and sold them for
about 70. But war-torn Paraguay offered 8s, and Honduras 10s, and these
bonds still could not be sold for more than 80 (Marichal 1989).
But a global macroeconomic and financial crisis was stirring yet again,
and a second wave of defaults soon spread over the region in the 1870s.
By the end of 1880 of the £123 million of British capital invested in
TABLE 2
BRITISH INVESTMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA AT THE END OF 1880
Country Total (£)
Private
enterprise
Government
bonds
Government bonds
in default (year)
Argentina 20,338,709 9,105,009 11,233,700 —
Bolivia 1,654,000 — 1,654,000 1,654,000 (1875)
Brazil 38,869,067 15,808,905 23,060,102 —
Chile 8,466,521 701,417 7,765,104 —
Costa Rica 3,304,000 — 3,304,000 3,304,000 (1874)
Cuba 1,231,600 1,231,600 na na
Dominican Republic 714,300 — 714,300 714,300 (1872)
Ecuador 1,959,380 135,380 1,724,000 1,824,000 (1868)
Guatemala 544,200 — 544,200 544,200 (1876)
Honduras 3,222,000 — 3,222,000 3,222,000 (1872)
Mexico 32,740,916 9,200,116 23,540,800 23,540,800 (1866)
Nicaragua 206,570 23,540,800 — —
Paraguay 1,505,400 — 1,505,400 1,505,400 (1874)
Peru 36,177,070 3,488,750 32,688,320 32,688,320 (1876)
Uruguay 7,644,105 4,124,885 3,519,220 —
Venezuela 7,564,390 1,161,590 6,402,800 —
General 10,274,660 10,274,660 na na
Total 179,490,261 56,412,255 123,078,006 71,097,020
Source: Rippy (1959, pp. 25, 32).
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Latin American government bonds, more than £71 million (58 per cent) were
in default (see Table 2). Some of these loans had been a bad idea in the first
place, and some were again tainted by fraud. But even the genuine loans in
the larger republics ran into servicing problems as the global depression
spread. Credit conditions suffered. A much wider global debt crisis was
under way of which Latin America was only a small part: by 1876 fifteen non-
European nations had defaulted to the tune of £300 million. Global capital
flows again ground to a halt and irate bondholders chased down the insol-
vent republics long into the 1880s. Settlements were again drawn out and
defaulting governments were shut out of new borrowing during negotiations
and often for many years beyond.
2.3. Third wave, crash and fourth wave
An even bigger borrowing boom began in the 1880s as global economic
activity, and especially trade, recovered. Defaulting governments gradually
straightened out their fiscal problems and sought access to credit again. The
overall flows were massive, and by the end of 1890 total British investments
in the region were £426 million, more than double the 1880 total. Of this,
£194 million sat in government bonds, now for the first time surpassed by a
slightly higher amount, £231 million, in securities issued by private enter-
prises (Rippy 1959).
The regional distribution of the new wave of investment favoured coun-
tries that prospered the most in the new trade boom. In the 1880s, capital
flows were concentrated in just five countries: 37 per cent in Argentina,
17 per cent in Mexico, 14 per cent in Brazil, 7 per cent in Chile and 5 per cent
in Uruguay. Government loans were more skewed, with 60 per cent of new
loans going to Argentina and Uruguay. Economic divergence was starting to
be seen: Foreign capital — which sought out the most profitable investment,
the most dynamic economies, and the most creditworthy countries — played
a part in furthering the economic divergence in the region (Marichal 1989).
As financial development and monetisation in Latin American economies
grew in the late 19th century, the consequences of government-induced
macroeconomic crises became deeper and more far-reaching. With any
increase in the probability of default, sovereign spreads widened and the
capital market tightened. Domestic banks found themselves in distress, and a
credit crunch followed that squeezed local borrowers. Whereas government
defaults in the 1820s and 1870s could bypass pre-modern economic modes of
production that relied more on retained profits and less on financial inter-
mediation, by the 1890s the region’s more modern economies risked more
resounding economic crises after a default. The major crises in the 1890s for
two large capital recipients, Argentina and Brazil, illustrated these new
financial risks.
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The first crisis was in Argentina — arguably the world’s first example of a
modern «emerging market» crisis, combining debt crisis, bank collapses,
maturity and currency mismatches, and contagion. Argentina’s bold devel-
opment strategy of the 1880s rested on a highly leveraged parastatal banking
sector, which borrowed in gold, and lent in pesos. When the economy fal-
tered and the fiscal gap widened, it was covered by money printing, which
broke the exchange rate peg and unleashed inflation. A generalised financial
and banking crisis ensued. Stabilisation and debt restructuring took the
better part of a decade. Foreign capital flows dried up as a consequence
of the regional impact of the Baring crash, and a global recession contributed
to a delayed recovery (della Paolera and Taylor 2001; Mitchener and
Weidenmier 2008).
The other major crisis then hit, in Brazil. Political and economic
instability was high in the 1890s following the proclamation of the Republic:
the country was adjusting to the abolition of slavery, the gold standard
had been abandoned, and inconsistent monetary and fiscal policies had
the printing presses running at full speed. The currency steadily devalued
by a factor of 3.5 from 1890 to 1898, adding to the domestic costs of
debt service. Default was put off for a time, but was unavoidable in 1898-
1900, and again in 1902-1909. By then, the real economy was by in deep
recession, having never really recovered from the financial instability of
the early 1890s (Cardoso and Dornbusch 1989; Fishlow 1989; Triner 2000;
Abreu 2006).
Global capital markets quickly recovered from the crisis of the 1890s,
although countries badly affected, notably Argentina, took longer to recover.
However, compared with the 1870s boom and bust, this one was not asso-
ciated with widespread default in the region, but rather a more general and
global increase in country risk that slowed foreign capital flows for the better
part of a decade. Inflows to Argentina and Uruguay were sluggish in the
1890s, but in other countries in the region the tap was still somewhat open as
shown in Table 3. As Table 3 also shows, capital flows resumed in full force
from 1900 to 1914, when, as is well known, capital flows surged in the great
fourth wave which represented the culminating years of the first age of
globalisation, an era only brought to an end by a political shock, the outbreak
of the Great War.
***
Latin America’s experience was characterised by successive booms and
busts, as four great waves of foreign capital flowed into the region; in the
booms both private investment and sovereign lending tended to surge, but
these episodes were separated by periods of near autarky in sovereign debt
markets and a retrenchment in private flows. Each wave generally ended
with a crisis in one or more countries. Very often it was a twin or triple crisis
that damaged the value of the currency, the solvency of public debt, and
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TABLE 3
CUMULATIVE GROSS CAPITAL FLOWS FROM BRITAIN TO LATIN AMERICA, 1880-1913
Growth rates
Type Country 1880
Share
(%) 1890
Share
(%) 1900
Share
(%) 1913
Share
(%)
1880-1890
(%)
1890-1900
(%)
1900-1913
(%)
Private Argentina 9 3 78 10 102 10 257 12 24 3 7
Brazil 10 3 29 4 40 4 90 4 11 3 6
Chile 1 0 12 2 18 2 32 2 28 4 4
Cuba 1 0 3 0 6 1 20 1 8 7 10
Mexico 4 1 19 2 27 2 64 3 17 4 7
Peru 2 1 5 1 6 1 11 1 10 1 5
Uruguay 5 2 12 2 14 1 20 1 9 2 3
These 7 32 11 157 20 212 20 494 24 17 3 7
All countries 296 100 770 100 1,064 100 2,065 100 10 3 5
All Argentina 21 3 132 10 160 9 332 10 20 2 6
Brazil 22 4 56 4 74 4 166 5 10 3 6
Chile 8 1 22 2 33 2 60 2 11 4 5
Cuba 1 0 3 0 6 0 26 1 8 7 13
Mexico 5 1 26 2 39 2 80 3 18 4 6
Peru 27 4 30 2 30 2 37 1 1 0 2
Uruguay 7 1 20 1 23 1 30 1 11 2 2
These 7 90 15 289 22 365 20 732 23 12 2 6
All countries 599 100 1,334 100 1,812 100 3,203 100 8 3 4
Note and Source: Millions of pounds, from Stone (1999).
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(especially in later times) the health of the financial sector. The inflows also
became rather more geographically concentrated over time. Markets tended
to pick out «winners» among these emerging markets, and fund them well,
even after crises; other countries gained access once or twice, but spent most
of their time excluded from large-scale external capital flows.
Still, the reach of the global capital market should not be overstated — the
country risk perceived by foreign investors remained high and only a handful
of countries had reputation enough regularly to issue external debt. Even as
late as 1913, the point of deepest maturation of the global capital market
before the 1980s and 1990s, the five countries of Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Mexico and Uruguay accounted for 90 per cent of outstanding Latin
American issues in London. Countries like Peru and Venezuela made occa-
sional issues, often merely rollovers of earlier defaults. Others were out of the
game entirely. In the first era of globalisation, just as today, capital flows
were highly volatile. To better show their stop-and-go nature Figure 1 pre-
sents annual data on capital flows to the region. If we compare trends in
capital flows with the country risk data in Figure 2, for then a more complete
picture of the global crises emerges. Booms were typically associated with a
FIGURE 1
BOOM AND BUST CYCLES, 1850-1914
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Source: Taylor (2005).
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FIGURE 2
COUNTRY RISK, 1870-1914
External Bond Spread over British Consol:
Latin America versus 11 Core & Empire Bonds
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convergence in bond spreads; defaults were associated with a sudden stop of
capital flows and dramatically increased country risk.
3. THEORY AND EVIDENCE
We have already seen in the previous section that Latin America’s
sovereign borrowers experienced very heterogeneous global credit market
conditions in the long 19th century. Some countries borrowed little, some a
lot. Some paid high rates of interest, some low. Some defaulted many times,
others did not. The formal study of sovereign debt, using theory and
empirics, seeks to explain such heterogeneity in outcomes.
The heterogeneity clearly reflected, in part, sovereign behaviour in respect
of past debts. It also reflected political and economic conditions in the bor-
rowing country. Qualitative evidence suggests that past behaviour mattered
for future access. After the first wave of borrowing in the 1820s, resumption
of borrowing was slow and irregular. In each subsequent wave, countries had
further opportunities to improve their credit record, and those that did
enjoyed access on better terms. Conversely, some countries handled their early
debts so badly that they were unable to issue much debt at all later in the
century. But one should also ask why did the ability to handle debt service vary
so widely? What were the deep fundamentals driving this outcome? Here we
might turn to the economic and political conditions in each country to try to
understand what affected a country’s ability and/or willingness to pay.
To disentangle competing explanations we turn to a combination of
theory and empirics. Theory has often viewed the existence of sovereign debt
as quite fragile, even mysterious. After all, if repayment cannot be enforced,
why would any sovereign debtor repay? One obvious answer would be to
secure reputational benefits in a repeated game where the punishment for
default is exclusion from future borrowing (Eaton and Gersovitz 1981). Such an
argument clearly depends on coordinated creditor action. One escape from that
assumption is to instead assume that punishments take another form, whereby
default spills over into other economic activity and cause others costs, for
example, to trade (Cole and Kehoe 1996; Rose and Spiegel 2002).
However, an extraordinary result shows that this explanation may not
sufficient when borrowing countries can save and build up buffer stocks of
external assets. Suppose that creditors cannot seize these assets, and suppose
these assets can contain contingencies similar to those of the debt contract.
At some point (e.g., during a bad state of nature) a country’s debt will be high
enough that its future expected surpluses would be better saved and con-
sumed rather than dissipated on debt service (Bulow and Rogoff 1989). The
intuition is clear, even if the robustness of this result depends on deeper
assumptions about the structure of financial markets (Kletzer and Wright
2000; Wright 2002).
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A recent contribution (Amador 2004) extends this analysis and highlights
another mechanism that might be important as a sustaining mechanism for
sovereign debt, one with particular resonance in the case of 19th century
Latin America. In the case of political competition, turnover among parties
ensures that current incumbents may be out of power for a time, only to
return in the future. In this case, they will be aware that the opposition might
gain power and — being short sighted like everyone in this game — they
would overspend and dissipate any buffer stock of assets. (Formally, this is
analogous to a problem of hyperbolic discounting.) This threat of dissipation
of any savings by the incumbent effectively blunts the incentive to employ a
default-plus-saving strategy a` la Bulow-Rogoff, since the assets will be spent
inefficiently, and it can be shown that servicing the debt then becomes
optimal. The interesting wrinkle here is that this argument only works for
what Amador calls «democracy» — meaning there is some kind of turnover
and current incumbents can come back after losing power (which might not
mean truly democratic at all, but only that there is some political competi-
tion). In contrast, the argument breaks down under «autocracy» — meaning
incumbents exit when they lose power and there is no political resurrection
of parties or groups that lose power. The latter scenario could be an apt
description of the violent world of mid-19th-century Latin America3.
However, in the 19th century, an explanation of historical outcomes
requires not just an explanation for debt’s existence but also for why it
worked so differently in one country vs. another. Why did some countries
borrow more than others? Why did some default more than others?
3.1. Variations in investment needs
Overall investment financed from abroad is not necessarily a good pre-
dictor of overall government spending financed from abroad. That is, the
economy-wide stock or flow of foreign investment need not correlate with
the subsets of flows and stocks involving the government sector. However, in the
19th century there were powerful reasons to expect a correlation between
the two and this logic underpins a discussion of the links between the two. The
basic reason for the high correlation of the two measures was the strong
complementarity between private and public sector investments in this period.
The case of transport and infrastructure is the obvious example. As we
have noted, foreign finance of railways was a dominant category of foreign
capital flows in this period (Twomey 2000). When the railroads were publicly
operated, the lending was directed via government borrowing. But even
3 See Vizcarra (2009, pp. 361 and 375) on Peru during the guano boom: «During this period,
Peru’s foreign debt was exceptional for two reasonsy. Despite Peru’s ongoing political instability
and poor market reputation, the price of Peruvian bonds soared shortly after settlement in 1849y
in the case of Peru the sanction in play was not a byproduct of superior political institutionsy».
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when the railroads were privately owned, the construction of the railroads
was often accompanied by significant public expenditure: related infra-
structure, guarantees and subsidies, and so on. The same was true of ports,
canals, and other large projects. At a more general level, a fast growing
economy generally needed broad investments in a whole range of public
goods as part of a «balanced growth» strategy, so that utilities, education,
and so on, would all be higher in a high investment path.
Can simple one-sector macroeconomic models help us here? These
models do not make a distinction at a fine level between types of capital, but
we need to keep such complementarities in mind when understanding the
motives of governments to borrow. We do know that the countries in the
region had very different investment needs in the 19th century and this cer-
tainly affected their overall need to draw on foreign capital inflows, and
hence their need to engage in infrastructure-led public borrowing.
In the simplest macroeconomic sense, we could speak of some countries
being much more capital scarce than others, and therefore having a much
higher marginal product of capital (MPK). In a standard neoclassical model,
capital would tend to flow to the countries with the highest MPK. However,
in what is known as the so-called «Lucas paradox», the highest MPK need
not be found in the poorest country (Lucas 1990).
Consider a standard production function where output per worker y
depends on productivity A and capital per worker k. If all countries have the
same productivity level A, then log MPK is perfectly inversely correlated with
log k, and classic diminishing returns means that capital will flow to the
poorest country. In general, this is not true: countries do not have the same A
and this offers the simplest resolution of the Lucas paradox. Much of the
great divergence in incomes between rich and poor countries today is
explained by A and not k (Hall and Jones 1999; Easterly and Levine 2001).
Explaining A (its level and/or its growth rate) has led to debate concerning
the importance of deeper determinants such as colonial history, human
capital, legal origins, institutions, policies or geography (Sachs and Warner
1995; Sachs et al. 1998; Acemoglu et al. 2001; Glaeser et al. 2004).
How well do the insight from this contemporary debate translate to the
19th century? And how well do any lessons apply to Latin America and the
heterogeneous experiences within the region?
At the most general level, recent historical research suggests that the
Lucas paradox was less apparent in the first era of globalisation than it is
today. Figure 3 shows Obstfeld and Taylor’s (2004) simple tabulation of the
distribution of foreign investments by country in 1913 and in 1997. In this
«then» vs. «now» comparison it is evident that the global capital markets of a
century ago were much more successful at directing financial flows to very
poor countries as compared with the capital markets of today. Moreover,
these flows included significant investments in Latin America, for example by
1913 cumulative gross capital flows from Britain to Latin America accounted
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for a lower bound of 23 per cent of total British overseas investments. This begs
the question as to what fundamental forces led to such an outcome. To do this
one may analyse the flows themselves, the quantities or the prices at which the
flows moved, which in the case of government debt means looking at the risk
premia charged to sovereign borrowers, a challenge we take up below.
3.2. Variations in saving scarcity
Since capital inflows are, by definition, the difference between domestic
investment and savings, it does not suffice to look only at investment-based
(demand side) determinants of capital flows, but also at the saving-based
(supply side) determinants. This applies as much to aggregate flows of sav-
ing, investment and foreign capital as it does to public (government) debt.
Two important aspects of the Latin American economies on the supply side
should be noted, factors that have persisted to some extent up to today:
financial underdevelopment and demography.
According to financial historians like Davis (1965), the function of capital
markets in the aggregate can be broken down into two functions: the
mobilisation of savings supply resources and the allocation of these resour-
ces to competing investment demands. If the system is efficient, then the
FIGURE 3
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maximal resources are mobilised, and they are allocated efficiently across
sectors and firms4. This ideal is never reached, and reality falls particularly
short in developing countries.
In a closed-economy view of the world, these failures of financial
development could place a serious brake on economic growth. (Schumpeter
1911; Gurley and Shaw 1955; King and Levine 1993). Some evidence has
been adduced to this effect, although controversy still swirls around the
finance-development nexus given the possible reverse causality running from
growth to finance.
In an open economy world, however, the inefficiency of financial markets
may place a tax on long-run national wealth, but it need not slow economic
growth. In a hypothetical frictionless world, small open economies lacking
the means to mobilise or allocate their own savings could still draw on the
pool of global savings available at the real world interest rate. Foreign banks
and financial firms might then enter the domestic market to allocate and
monitor the capital so raised. In line with this logic, in the 19th century,
differences in domestic financial development did not necessarily hinder
countries’ ability to accumulate capital, even if they did affect subsequent
development paths once the global capital market collapses5.
For government finance, the effect was to supply at low transaction costs
a large group of counterparties in London, and elsewhere, who were willing
to subscribe to government debt issues, for whom the investments in any one
periphery country were a small part of their portfolio. In contrast, working
through the domestic financial market meant high transaction costs using
inefficient banks to reach a small pool of domestic investors for whom a debt
issue would be a large share of their portfolio. It is easy to understand why
the former route would be preferable. Indeed, the latter route was often
ignored, unless there were telling reasons to use it — for example, a loss of
access to external credit after a default, or a desire to engage in financial
repression or «forced savings» and thus tax the domestic bond holders
(whether institutions or individuals) either through below market nominal
interest rates or via the inflation tax on paper debt, tactics that could not be
exploited too often without totally destroying what little financial development
there was.
4 See, however, Flandreau and Flores (2009) on «bonds and brands»; more on this topic later in
this paper.
5 For example, Davis and Gallman (2001) find that in the «settler economies» the British
Dominions generally had more advanced financial systems than Argentina, a finding consistent with
the account of della Paolera and Taylor (2001). In the Argentine case, penetration by foreign banks,
many of them branches of London banks, brought the country to the doorstep of the deep and liquid
British financial markets. In this type of setting, foreign financial development can substitute for —
and thus crowd out — domestic financial development. See also Regalsky (2002) on the influence of
French Banks during the third and fourth waves. This effect was probably at work in many less
developed economies, within and beyond the British Empire, before 1914.
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In essence then, open capital markets created the possibility of «trade
diversion» in asset trade. We can recast this in the language of gravity models,
which have been successfully applied to financial flows also. In a country with
poorly developed capital markets the intra-national transaction costs were high.
If the country were closed, however, «multilateral resistance» against all foreign
countries would be high, sustaining the domestic market. But if inter-national
transaction costs suddenly fell — globalisation — the country would be
expected to divert financial flows from domestic to foreign markets.
These forces were something of a double-edged sword in countries that
plugged into the global capital market before 1914. On the plus side they
made the supply of capital much more elastic, and this could help explain the
very positive association between foreign investment and growth, notwith-
standing any claim about causality (Schularick and Steger 2006). On the
minus side, these pressures possibly deterred domestic financial develop-
ment. The latter proved to be a major weakness once global capital supply
dried up after 1914. Countries had to turn to the domestic supply of capital,
and domestic intermediaries. As argued, the intermediaries were often few
and inefficient6. In addition, supply of capital was low too. Why?
The dominant explanation argues not only that savers were cutoff from
investors by high transaction costs, but that savers were themselves rather
scarce for demographic reasons. Taylor (1992) made the argument for
Argentina, and it would apply to some other countries too. In many devel-
oping countries then, as now, fertility and population growth rates were very
high. The standard life cycle argument would predict that such countries
would tend to save less, as compared with countries with a more mature
population with greater numbers in high-saving mid-life cohorts. Taylor and
Williamson (1994) show how these effects could explain a fair portion of the
capital flows from Britain to the settler economies before 1914.
This argument offers another explanation for the need for governments to
borrow from abroad — at home, there were few savers in the population.
This may well have been efficient for other reasons. Much domestic saving in
Latin America was within the firm or the household, and this was probably
important for the financing of many small firms and businesses. We know,
for example, that domestic stock markets were often quite thin and banks
were often financing only large firms with some type of «connection» (Haber
1991; Triner 2000; Regalsky 2002; Hanley 2005). Thus, small enterprises, if
they relied on domestic saving were liable to feel crowding out if government
borrowing went directly to bond issues to the domestic market, simply because
such small firms were likely to have severe asymmetric information problems
that would preclude them issuing debt or equity abroad. On the other hand,
the government was rather better placed to issue debt overseas as compared
6 Flandreau and Flores (2009) discuss inefficiency in the 1820s/1830s era. The problem may
have abated, but not entirely disappeared, in subsequent decades.
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with such small firms, so it did them a favour by doing so, leaving most of the
market and non-market domestic capital flows untouched.
***
So far we have examined government (and aggregate) borrowing as
driven by the forces of demand and supply. However, a third and final set of
factors must be considered — frictions or wedges, in the form of transaction
costs. These costs raise the expected return of the marginal dollar invested
above the expected returns of the marginal dollar saved, and thus serve to
inhibit transactions between borrowers and lenders.
For 19th century Latin American governments borrowing in the world
capital market, these frictions took two principal forms: exclusion from the
market, leading to quantity rationing; or market access subject to a risk
premium, a sovereign spread over the market’s benchmark bond yield
(in those days the British consol). Market exclusion, as we have seen, was
typically a result of unresolved past defaults. What drove risk premia?
A considerable body of research in recent years has explored this topic, and
several pertinent findings can be summarised7.
3.3. Gold standard
In a seminal paper, Bordo and Rockoff (1996) offered evidence that
sovereign borrowers received a lower risk premium when they adhered to the
gold standard — the authors referred to this as a «seal of approval» whereby
the sound policies necessary to achieve successful (i.e., credible) commit-
ment to the gold standard also operated to lower the macroeconomic risks
that were of concern to holders of sovereign debt, namely the risks of default
because of economic underperformance or fiscal crisis. This hypothesis was
lent further support by Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) who studied much larger
sample of countries in the 1870-1913 period. The risk premium appeared to
be 40 or more basis points lower for a country after it went on gold, and this
effect remained after many other controls were added.
Of course, being on the gold standard was an endogenous outcome and
was also correlated with many other macroeconomic variables, so this effect
needs to be carefully interpreted. More generally, attempts to extend the
Bordo-Rockoff analysis by adding right-hand side variables to produce a
«kitchen sink» regression have to be interpreted with care, and if the right-
hand side variables are collinear with the gold standard then the results may
be meaningless.
To illustrate the correlation problem, we can examine results in Flandreau
and Zumer (2004) where exchange rate volatility is added to most regressions
7 For a comprehensive of this topic, the reader is referred to Mauro et al. (2006). See also on
spreads and institutions Accominotti et al. (2011).
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and the authors find that the inclusion of this variable reduces or negates the
impact of gold standard adherence. This is not surprising since going on gold
was the way in which countries lowered their exchange rate volatility in this
period: hence these results, which ignore the fact that exchange rate volatility
depends on the exchange rate regime, offer no evidence for or against the «seal
of approval» hypothesis. A more robust attack on the gold standard effect was
offered by Ferguson and Schularick (2006, 2012): they have a larger sample that
includes many African and Asian poor countries. In poorer countries (where the
cutoff was in the US$1,000-2,000 per capita range in 1900, roughly 20-40 per cent
of the British level), the impact of the gold standard on spreads appears
weak: perhaps their politico-economic institutions were too weak to make
gold standard commitments credible. However, in samples that focus more
on the rich Atlantic economies, and include the main Latin American bor-
rowers the gold standard effect remains. We might infer that, as a region of
middling incomes and middling institutional quality, Latin America was
poised on the periphery of an Atlantic club where gold standard adherence
could, if credible, offer some benefits.
Even if that is accepted, however, the endogeneity of the gold standard is
a more difficult nut to crack. Econometrically, Obstfeld and Taylor (2003)
used GMM techniques to address this issue, but other approaches still need
to be explored, for example the use of a first-stage model of gold standard
adoption along the lines proposed in an innovative paper by Meissner (2005).
These results matter for the Latin American countries in the 19th century
because they were generally among the weakest of countries at maintaining
gold standard adherence. However, returning to the endogeneity issue, this
really begs the question: why? What was it about the region’s economies that
made it so difficult for them to stick to a hard monetary regime?
3.3. War
Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) also included controls for the occurrence of
military conflict involving the sovereign borrower, both civil war and inter-
state war. Perhaps surprisingly, both of these variables turned out to be
statistically insignificant as determinants of country risk. Ferguson and
Schularick (2006) found mixed results. However, the arguments of Bordo
and Kydland (1995) that the gold standard was a «contingent rule» caution
against a simple interpretation of these weak findings. Wars tended to mean
going off gold, so indirectly, via the gold standard effect, we may still be
capturing an effect of conflict on sovereign risk. Returning to the last point,
we can see here one endogenous source of weak gold standard adherence.
In this sense, we do find support for the notion that the prevalence of conflict
in the region may have had something to do with Latin America’s high
sovereign risk. Again, this cautions against using the kitchen sink regression
as a means to refute the gold standard as a seal of approval.
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3.4. Institutions and empire
Looking at institutional determinants, it is not clear that most parts of
Latin America could have been expected to attract large-scale capital flows.
Stressing extractive institutions arising from colonial origins, Acemoglu et al.
(2001) reach a conclusion that builds on the insights of North and Thomas
(1973) concerning the legacy of Iberian rule in Latin America. Spain and
Portugal did not establish colonies that were characterised by good political
and economic institutions. Power was concentrated in privileged elites,
democracy never flourished, property rights and rule of law were weak
(except where needed to protect the elite). In the AJR account these flaws
persisted after independence, and slowed economic growth, keeping the
region poor. Here, institutions are the fundamental driver of A, which in a
Solovian model determines a country’s level of productivity and hence
income per capita in the long run as k converges to a steady state level that
depends itself on A.
The Acemoglu et al. view is often — wrongly — seen as purely determi-
nistic, but of course there is still an error term in their model, and residual
variation is significant. Between the colonial past and present outcomes,
history reveals even bigger residual variance. In a challenge to the persis-
tence story Prados de la Escosura (2005) notes that the «great divergence»
between Latin America and the core economies was even more a 20th century
than a 19th century phenomenon. If Prados de la Escosura is correct, then,
perhaps despite political and institutional weaknesses, the region did man-
age to sustain growth in the 19th century, and hence became attractive to
foreign capital, except where the worst political and institutional failures
could not be contained.
This may call for future research to assess the more detailed mechanisms
needed for an «institutional explanation» — that is, why some institutions
matter more than others, and at some times more than others. For example,
Vizcarra (2009) explains clearly that the vast amount of exportable resources
(the guano) and a well-structured debt service scheme could overcome the
complete lack of Peruvian stable political institutions. Some countries
obviously surmounted their colonial legacies, if only for a time, and were
able to get onto a reasonably fast growth track. The most dramatic example
would be Argentina, which by 1900-1913 was one of the five richest countries
in the world and a prime destination for foreign capital. Argentina’s sub-
sequent growth failures put the country back in the ranks of the less devel-
oped a century later, so perhaps its colonial legacy finally caught up with it.
Brazil, and several other countries have also witnessed ups and down in
growth performance, yet without sustained convergence. These perturbations
along the development path deserve greater scrutiny, as we need to better
understand the extent to which countries are «prisoners of history» and how
many degrees of freedom they have that allow them to escape from their past.
GERARDO DELLA PAOLERA/ALAN M. TAYLOR
192 Revista de Historia Econo´mica, Journal of lberian and Latin American Economic History
In this respect Latin America again stands as a crucial test case. In other
areas of the periphery still under colonial rule, it would be simple to attribute
the large flows of capital in the 1870-1913 period to institutions, such as rule
of law and property rights that were enforced by the colonial powers them-
selves. As Lucas himself noted:
Until around 1945, much of the Third World was subject to European-
imposed legal and economic arrangements, and had been so for dec-
ades or even centuries. A European lending to a borrower in India or
the Dutch East Indies could expect his contract to be enforced with
exactly the same effectiveness and by exactly the same means as a
contract with domestic borrowers. (Lucas 1990, pp. 94-95)
The same idea supports the theory of «anglobalization» that underpins
Ferguson’s (2003) qualified rehabilitation of the benefits of the British
Empire. Of course, empires have since collapsed and it can be argued that
this crucial difference explains the absence of a Lucas paradox then, but its
presence today (Schularick and Steger 2006).
Whether one views the financial and institutional exports of the European
imperial epoch as a plus or a minus, it is fair to say that Latin America’s post-
independence experience remains relatively neglected in this explanatory
framework, and fits none to well either with the pro- or anti-colonial view.
The region was politically independent then, as now; and some countries
enjoyed respectable economic growth and capital market access; we still
have to answer how they pulled it off. On the one hand, defaults were
undoubtedly higher «on average» than in the Empire group. On the other
hand, the region still managed to attract significant capital flows despite
those risks. The benefits (returns) must have outweighed the costs (risks),
which would be consistent with the Prados de la Escosura (2005) story that,
despite its flaws, some parts of the region had good growth potential. Colonial
origins did not doom the region to failure, at least up to 1914.
The empire thesis was examined by Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) and
Ferguson and Schularick (2006, 2012). Both found little evidence for an
«average» discount based on British empire membership using the industry-
standard (Bordo-Rockoff 1996) CAPM framework, but the latter found
stronger support for a lower «beta» among Empire borrowers when an
Empire-beta interaction was added. Ferguson and Schularick (2006, 2012)
have the advantage of an even bigger sample than Obstfeld and Taylor
(2003), including many more British colonies in Asia and Africa, although
such a sample obviously weights Latin American observations a lot less. Both
also found evidence of noticeable convergence of risk premia over the 1870-
1914 period. In the Ferguson-Schularick framework, this trend is mopped up
either by time dummies or by the CAPM Empire-beta interaction, and in
both cases it negates the gold standard effect: in the former case «something
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else» explains convergence and in the latter case it is the gradual diminishing
amplitude of the global weighted risk premium. Of course, either or both of
these effects are correlated with the global spread of the gold standard, so
inference is still unclear. We need to remember that the gold standard was
not viewed as a fundamental by Bordo et al.: merely as a «seal of approval»
which, if credible, was indicative of other fundamentals. Such fundamentals
could, of course, include the Empire — where the gold standard was virtually
a sine qua non of macroeconomic regime design.
Could such an alternative explanation exist for interest rate convergence
after 1870? Perhaps «institutional convergence» was afoot in the global
economy in this period? Schularick and Steger (2006) argue that smaller
property rights differentials could explain the absence of a Lucas paradox
before 1914. However, with no data on property rights before 1914, this
hypothesis awaits further testing, for example, in the manner of Alfaro et al.
(2005). But why would such a convergence have occurred? And when? One
might appeal to the notion of «informal empire» or «soft power» to argue
that, in effect, British (or at the least, European) capitalistic norms were
being spread around the globe under the influence of the colonial police
powers — that «anglobalization» had spillovers beyond the formal empire
itself by setting global «rules of the game» in the shape of norms for good
behaviour, that is, global public goods (Ferguson and Schularick 2006, 2012).
Such an argument would say that, for all its notional independence, Latin
America could not have chosen to abrogate property rights before 1914
without facing deep shame and (more importantly) stiff penalties. There is
some evidence that the flexing of U.S. power in the Latin American region
may have been instrumental in this regard (Mitchener and Weidenmier
2005). However, with no way to measure informal empire or its influence,
these conjectures remain largely untestable. Indeed, if the entire globe is
under the sway of an informal empire, the hypothesised effect cannot be
identified at all.
3.5. Default history
Another place to look for an explanation of high sovereign risk is in the
default record. Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) found a high penalty for con-
temporaneous default: maybe 100 basis points for full default and 50 basis
points for partial default. But what about the longer term record? Ferguson
and Schularick (2006, 2012) also find a strong impact of past default on
current spreads.
The role of past default in determining current spreads is central to the
«reputation» model of the sovereign debt market. The 1820s and 1870s
crises started to cement in investors’ minds the untrustworthiness of Latin
American sovereign borrowers, a reputation that was to expand in the years
ahead and which persists even to this day. According to Tomz (2001), of the
GERARDO DELLA PAOLERA/ALAN M. TAYLOR
194 Revista de Historia Econo´mica, Journal of lberian and Latin American Economic History
seventy-seven government defaults from 1820 to 1914, fifty-eight involved
Latin American countries (75 per cent). Compared with other periphery
countries, the economic potential and sovereign independence of the region
obviously encouraged this outcome: the potential for high returns encour-
aged more borrowing ex ante and the independence from Empire gave more
freedom to default ex post.
Clearly the borrowers in the region could not manage their fiscal affairs
with anything approaching the prudence of most borrowers in the core
countries. Figure 4 shows the incidence of sovereign default in the region
from 1820 to 1940 and the fraction of years that debtors spent in default
status is impressive, 38 per cent on average. The better-behaved borrowers
like Uruguay (12 per cent) or Brazil (17 per cent) managed to maintain
a pretty clean sheet, but the odds of getting repayment from others like
Honduras (79 per cent) or Mexico (57 per cent) were no more favourable
than a coin toss.
We can assess the importance of reputation for capital market access in
the first era of globalisation by following Reinhart et al. (2003, «RRS») and
FIGURE 4
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Reinhart and Rogoff (2004, 2009 «RR»). We look at the relationship between
default history and country risk. The country’s default history is captured by
the number of defaults or the fraction of years spent in default over a spe-
cified prior period, in this case 1801-1900. Country risk is measured by the
spread of the country’s long-term gold bond yield over the benchmark yield
of the British consol, using data collected by Obstfeld and Taylor (2003), in
this case for 1900-1913.
We might expect that a country with a record of «serial default» ought to
be penalised with higher country risk, and «RRS» show that this is the case
in the present era. «RR» show that this behaviour matters for capital market
access today. Was it true in the past also? Figure 5 shows that more defaults
and longer defaults in the 19th century were associated with higher spreads
in 1900-1913. In other words, the problem of serial default is an old one, and
there appears to be evidence that even in the 19th century, global capital
markets were quick to identify and punish a serial defaulter.
3.6. Fiscal burdens: levels and volatility
Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) found that debt/GDP ratios had very little
impact on sovereign risk in the 1870-1914 period, suggesting that so long as
the debt path was consistent with gold standard adherence, creditors were
willing to take the latter signal as credible and allow quite wide movements
in public debt to GDP ratios, a pattern that was to change dramatically in
the interwar period. Nonetheless, alternative models of risk premia in the
1870-1914 period have given different results: Flandreau and Zumer (2004)
and Ferguson and Schularick (2006, 2012) found evidence that debt/revenue
ratios did matter for sovereign risk, and that in some specifications these
debt burden measures could sometimes lessen the impact of gold standard
adherence. Empirically, the question is likely to remain unresolved until we
can better model the endogeneity of debt levels, which were surely correlated
with the ability to make a credible gold standard commitment. But in theory
the result is clear: unsustainable debt paths will usually break any commit-
ment to gold, since they are almost surely indicative of fiscal weaknesses that
will, at least in some states of nature, cause explosive budget dynamics. It is
quite possible that the gold standard seal would not be apparent once such a
control was added.
However, debt levels are not the only matter of concern for creditors. The
volatility of the fiscal situation is also important. The unusual volatility of
public debt in the region is shown in Table 4. More than the core or the
periphery as a whole, the Latin American economies seem to have been more
susceptible than any other group of countries to extreme fluctuations in
public debt to GDP ratios. The region’s governments experienced big run ups
in debt levels during periods of easy credit, followed by big crashes during
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FIGURE 5
SERIAL DEFAULT AND COUNTRY RISK
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tighter times or after a default/repudiation episode. This led to higher means
and standard deviations of public debt to GDP ratios as compared with other
countries, especially core countries and even other periphery countries. In an
institutionally sound and financially mature environment, such data might
reflect the decisions of a strong optimising government taking maximal
advantage of the flexibility provided by a debt-financed buffer. But in a
financially and fiscally backward periphery environment these data tell a
different story — a tale of fiscal «snakes and ladders» where governments
were poorly equipped to cope with tax and spending shocks, forced to use
debt (when not using the printing press), and eventually crashing into debt
ceilings, followed by default, and austerity.
One might view these higher moments of the fiscal deficit as exogenous
«fundamentals» linked to political and institutional weakness. In this view,
Latin American countries were burdened with fiscal volatility either because
their tax revenues were volatile (e.g., due to trade volatility and terms of trade
shocks affecting customs revenue) or because spending was volatile (e.g., due
to wars and military spending caused by internal/external political instabil-
ity). Alternatively, shocks may have been no different but the governments’
propensity to use external borrowing may have simply been higher. The
latter might reflect institutional weakness of a different sort, namely the sub-
optimally short time horizons of sovereigns. Whatever the origin, it is clear
that Latin America governments lived in a more fiscally volatile world and
witnessed more dramatic fluctuations in their debt positions than other
countries in the core or periphery.
3.7. Access to capital markets: the microeconomic explanation
A recent, novel, and compelling explanation addresses the issue of how
sovereign debt emerges, subsides and then again re-emerges, as advanced by
Flandreau and Flores (2009). The central problem they analyse is a scenario
where there are severe information asymmetries, where countries renege on
their contractual arrangements, and where financial intermediaries have
incentives either to make debt sustainable against all macroeoconomic odds
or to cheat investors. In their explanation it is the reputation or «brand» of
TABLE 4
VOLATILITY OF PUBLIC DEBT TO GDP RATIO, 1870-1913
Sample n Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Latin America 149 1.31 0.91 0.29 3.39
Periphery 439 0.99 0.77 0.11 3.54
Core 391 0.46 0.39 0.01 1.42
Source: Obstfeld and Taylor (2004).
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the financial intermediary or underwriter which is the key mechanism
that helps overcome the enormous information asymmetries and market
imperfections. This approach addresses two related stylised facts to solve the
sovereign debt puzzle: (1) the existence in general of overshooting in lending
and (2) the heterogeneous performance of countries seen during each of the
capital flow waves.
Their study differentiates between wildcat underwriters and top-rank
well-reputed ones; evidence suggests that more reputable banks with a longer
time horizon supported borrowers with the intention to help maintain their
access to capital markets. In contrast, wildcat underwriters would engage in
selling the bonds with a short horizon. They observe that many sovereign
defaults followed and yet did not precede intermediaries’ failures. According
to this market structure analysis the underwriting business was a hierarchy
— not a competitive perfect market. And the champions of all were the
Rothschilds who always signalled the best of the best investment-grade
securities. A contrast is the Barings house that was involved with issuers of
much more risky bonds, as became clear. When the Rothschilds acted as
underwriters of Brazil, for example, they put at stake their own reputation
but also this acted as a transfer of information about the fundamentals of the
country via the underwriter. In this view, even if investors could not learn
directly very much about borrowers and their fundamentals, they could learn
more easily about underwriters, the more reputable of which could then give
a bond issue a «seal of approval». The hierarchy of underwriters was thus a
proxy for the hierarchy of users. On the other hand, the fact that prominent
houses did act as agents, but not as underwriters, could have signaled «risky
bets» and hence might have fed sizeable periods of overborrowing.
4. SOVEREIGN PUBLIC DEBT AND THE MACROECONOMIC
HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA
Access to foreign savings to finance either public or/and private enter-
prises was a permanent characteristic that has conditioned the economic
development of the region. The external or sovereign public debt played a
«multipurpose» function in the region’s development and sheds an important
light on the dynamic linkages between public finances and developmental
and infrastructural needs of these newly independent nations.
We argue that key aspects of the sovereign debt — its size, availability
and, most importantly its strategic management — cannot be understood
solely in terms of a simple closed economy macroeconomic model which
might be suited to study the nature and evolution of debt in countries such as
Britain, France, Germany, and even the idiosyncratic case of the newly set-
tled United States. In these countries that successfully developed internal
capital markets, tax smoothing and the presence of «abnormal» spikes in the
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level of the internal public debt (relative to GDP) are basically a by-product of
recessions in the former case and the finance of war efforts in the latter case
(Barro 1989)8. But, in general, these countries, during the modern era, could
finance their public budget imbalances by resorting to the issuance of
internal public debt denominated in their domestic currency or by engi-
neering changes in tax policies. The effectiveness of such tax policies
depended on a diversified tax base, something lacking in the fiscally fragile
nations of Latin America. In Latin America, the conduct and management of
public finances crucially determined how these independent countries coped
with turbulence and illiquidity in international capital markets, particularly
when a net transfer of resources to the capital markets in the central coun-
tries had to be effected.
Public debt, and especially sovereign public debt, was also linked to: (a) the
finance of the immense economic opportunities present in Latin America in
which the new nation states were stakeholders; (b) the building of new infra-
structure to channel the production of goods or extraction of natural resources
to the developed world; (c) the support of sound monetary and banking regimes
in light of accepted international standards; and (d) the guarantee of a mini-
mum rate of return to certain private equity ventures, to hedge some of the risk
of inward foreign direct investment. Obviously, the private inflow of capital for
direct investment and for trade financing is a topic of utmost importance for
developmental issues in Latin America and it has been very well documented by
Feis (1931) and Davis and Huttenback (1988) for the British Empire. In this
study we examine the experience and strategic issues concerning the issuance of
sovereign public debt in Latin America countries. In our discussion, we do not
explicitly include the financing of the independence wars of Latin America,
because the experience is very heterogeneous in the different nations of the
region, as many have noted.
As is evident today, where we witness similar levels of integration in
international bonds markets, turbulence is to be expected. According to
Harold Peters, a respected scholar of the Argentine debt:
The Latin-American republics have always been burdened with debt,
perhaps as a necessary condition of independencey. The flow of
capital from Great Britain, and later from the continent and the United
States to debtor countries, has been an intermittent one. Waves of
intense optimism, during which almost any properly engraved certi-
ficate, could be sold at a high price, have alternated with troughs of
8 Although as Ferguson (2001, p. 142) points out correctly: «Although the American Federal
Government never defaulted on its debt, the same cannot be said of the American States themselves.
In the recession of 1837–43, there were defaults on around half of the outstanding state debt; 10 per
cent of the total amount owed by the states was repudiated altogether. There were further rashes of
default in 1857 and again in the 1870s. Latin American States were the perennial defaulters of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries».
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profound pessimism, in which the export of capital stopped com-
pletely. There is one thing for which a subscriber to an issue of foreign
bonds by an undeveloped country must be prepared — an interval of
default. (Peters 1934, p. 1)
The statement resonates with many of the most modern theoretical devel-
opments about the sustainability of the dynamics of the public debt for an
underdeveloped country: the dependence on the world economic cycle in
terms of the evolution of international interest rates and the evolution of the
terms of trade for a particular indebted country and the phenomenon of
«sudden stops» (and also «sudden gos») to use the terminology of Calvo (1998).
The extent of booms and busts of export of capital to Latin America shown in
Section 1 is totally in accord with the sudden stops lately analysed by Calvo and
others; and the varied experiences reveal how Latin America countries managed
sovereign debts and resolved critical situations in their relations with the
creditor advanced nations, as the following vignettes illustrate.
4.1. Vignettes: sovereign borrowing episodes in Latin American
economic history
4.1.1. The characteristics of sovereign bonds during the 1820-1930 period
In the 19th century, sovereign bonds typically had a very long maturity.
They averaged more than 20 years while in the current globalisation of the
1990s and 2000s the issue of Eurobonds by emerging market sovereigns was
at maximum maturities of 7-10 years. Some of the contemporary bonds may
have had clauses of semi-automatic renewal, but we have still not observed
anything like the 25-year bonds that were typically seen in the 1820s-1930s
epoch. Also, in particular, the 1870-1913 period witnessed a situation in
which early redemption clauses were the norm in the structuring of the
public debt issues (the so-called «lottery clause», allowing partial repayment
and conversion). This tells us that the international capital markets of the
19th century (notably, the London Market) took a «friendly» approach
towards debtor countries, allowing them to refinance and swap long-term
debt instruments for comparable instruments at lower interest or coupon
rates to exploit favourable liquidity conditions (Mauro et al. 2006).
As Bordo and Meissner (2005) have shown, most of the sovereign bonds
floated by Latin American countries in the period were denominated in foreign
currency or in terms of gold (or else had «gold clauses»). The limitation for an
emerging country to issue a bond only in a hard or key currency was referred by
Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) as «original sin» and they viewed this as a
symptom of extreme fragility that might explain the recurrence of interruptions
in the original contractual debt obligations of the emerging market countries.
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Here, the linkages between monetary regimes, public finances, the level of
economic activity, and the sovereign debt issued in foreign currency provides
important insights that help explain recurrent problems in the management of
the sovereign debt in Latin America countries9.
Owing to the acute credibility problems posed by the conduct of volatile
monetary and fiscal policies, the Latin America countries also issued
domestic debt with gold clauses. This is shown in Figure 6 taken from Bordo
and Meissner (2005), we can see that two very big Latin American countries,
Brazil and Argentina, consistently issued public debt by resorting to gold
clauses or hard currency denominations.
FIGURE 6
ORIGINAL SIN
Source: Bordo and Meissner (2005).
9 On the Baring Crash of 1891 see Eichengreen (1999), della Paolera and Taylor (2001), Ferns
(1992), Mitchener and Weidenmier (2008), Flores (2011).
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Finally a notable difference with today’s international markets was that in
many debt issues export revenues and tax revenues were earmarked as col-
lateral to guarantee the servicing of the debt. In other words, it seems that
some public bonds had explicit «seniority» over the same type of bonds
issued by the same national political entity. Clauses linking different bonds
— to prevent selective default — were not a central feature as they are in the
present day international bond market.
4.1.2. The cost of capital for a small independent nation: moral hazard
and collusion among lenders and borrowers or the price to pay for
the reputation of a newcomer?
It is well known — notwithstanding the frictions and productivity differ-
ences underlying the Lucas paradox — that when the yield of available invest-
ments in the core countries drops, the international capital market has a strong
tendency to funnel liquidity to more risky prospects in the periphery. This is
evident today, but was just as true in the 1820s, 1870s and 1880s. Hence, the
possibility of «overborrowing» arises when extremely high liquidity in inter-
national capital markets becomes an equilibrium possibility. An instance of
«irrational exuberance» in the case of some of the riskier speculations in the
wave of the 1820s cannot be totally ruled out. It is implicit in the arguments of
Flandreau and Flores (2009), and the following example illustrates.
A basic guiding principle can be set forth: potential lemons behave always
like «seasoned» public bonds in good times — they just become junk bonds
in bad times. The example of the 1824 £1 million so-called «Baring loan»
to the Province of Buenos Aires is a very interesting case that illuminates
the behaviour of the various actors involved in a sovereign debt placement.
As Peters (1934) explains, the loan was placed with Baring Brothers at
70 per cent. Barings then deducted 13 per cent of the par amount (£130,000)
so the loan yielded the Province of Buenos Aires a mere £570,000. Then
the bonds were placed in the London market at 85 per cent of par, yielding to
Baring Brothers a spread of 15 per cent, and a further £150,000 profit. With
total profits of £280,000 on a loan of £570,000, the merchant house achieved a
return of 49 per cent! This is one of the many instances noted by Fodor (2002,
p. 35): he argues that data usually used for the Latin American loans cannot be
accepted at face value and should be treated with many caveats. As far as the
loans are concerned, perhaps there was no boom at all. While it is true that as
market makers and subscribers, the merchant house had their reputation at
stake, the initial phases of outburst of financial liquidity in the London market
were exploited to the full by the same houses as well as by the policymakers in
the recipient countries10.
10 As stated by Duncan (1983).
SOVEREIGN DEBT IN LATIN AMERICA, 1820-1913
Revista de Historia Econo´mica, Journal of lberian and Latin American Economic History 203
While the net proceeds to the recipient were very low in this first
experiment of the Province of Buenos Aires, and indeed very profitable for
the merchant houses, the gross yield to maturity of the bond approached
7 per cent, equivalent to a 4.5 per cent spread over the British consol. The
«risk premium» or spread is traditionally viewed as the «price of access» to
capital markets for emerging market borrowers and is in accord with Tomz
(2007) who argues that it is not the particularities of the international capital
market that characterise the interactive behaviour of investors and borrowers
but rather the formation of reputation11. And reputations form in Bayesian way:
creditors update the debtor’s creditworthiness based on performance. Tomz
considers two periods: the first wave (1820s) and the second wave (1870s). Then
he identifies the differential premium between seasoned borrowers and new
entries; in the second wave he also distinguishes between the good, the bad and
the worse: that is, the payers, the resettlers and the defaulters.
As we can see from Figure 7, in the first wave, as in the example of
Argentina given above, the Latin American economies were new borrowers
par excellence and spreads were around 350 basis points. In the second wave
of the 1870s, the market attached «reasonable» prices to the seasoned
players, the new borrowers and the proven lemons or junk bonds (the latter
having an average yield of 2,700 basis points).
The fall in yields from the 1820s to the 1870s marked an important
development in the region’s access to global markets. The high cost of capital
in the first wave might have been associated with the building-up of
reputation for the early borrowers, but, in addition, genuine asymmetric
information problems were surely quite acute during the 1820-1870 period
which would also drive up the required yield on a sovereign bond.
FIGURE 7
REPUTATION: FIRST AND SECOND WAVE SPREADS
First Wave Second Wave
Source: Tomz (2001).
11 Basically his argument is that, even if outrageous, those large investment banking lump-sum
fees are infra-marginal and can not characterise the dynamics of the sovereign debt market.
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4.1.3. Availability of information and the importance of news
Paucity of information was a major issue, especially until the second wave
in the 1870s. In the 1820s there were in London several very important
newspapers that compiled quite sophisticated data: on bond pricing and
volumes traded, and also quotes on the political economy events of different
countries. The Colonist, Common Sense, The Times and Course of Exchange
followed closely the Latin American debt during the first phase on a daily
basis until the generalised defaults of 1826-1827. From the information we
could gather from the six years 1822-1828 were data on a good portion of the
sovereign bonds outstanding, allowing us to construct a Latin American
bond composite index that is quite comparable with the current EMBI index,
as seen in Figure 812.
FIGURE 8
LONDON LATIN AMERICAN BOND INDEX FOR THE FIRST WAVE
Source: See text.
12 We should not however underestimate the availability of internal information as Fodor
(2002, p. 29) states: «There was also excellent private information circulating in Buenos Airesy. It
strongly suggests that there were a few people in Buenos Aires that were extremely well informed of
what was going on in London behind the scenes; they had much better inside information than that
available to the average London investor».
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During the second wave, however, the availability of news was much
more fluid. Information on macro variables such as outstanding debt per
nation, trade flows, fiscal positions, population, railway construction as a
proxy for investment, prices and quotations of sovereign bonds were readily
available from additional sources such as Investor’s Monthly Manual, The
Economist, the Palmer’s Index and from the Annual Reports of the Corporation
of Foreign Bondholders that was created in the mid 1860s as an association of
British investors holding bonds issued by the emerging economies.
Whether the availability of this information, plus the Consular Reports
being drafted by the different Creditor Nations, meant a better under-
standing of the political economy realities of the Latin American countries is,
we think, debatable. In the case of Argentina, Peters (1934) noted that:
A federal union was again formed in 1861, without definitely solving
many of the controversial issues between Buenos Aires and the other
provincesy.the lack of knowledge of and confidence in the Argentine
Republic, as distinct from Buenos Aires, led to the failure of the
attempt [to float a national bond in 1866]yThe Buenos Aires bonds
remained about ten points above a national issue, indicating that the
investors feared a possible dissolution of the union, and the possible
repudiation of the debt by the province. (Peters 1934, p. 24)
He then shows clearly that the messy arrangements of fiscal federalism gave
rise to asymmetric information for foreign investors, coordination problems
at the national level, moral hazard and free riding. These problems have
always been present and have made it very difficult to achieve a full under-
standing of the presence of different political subunits as major actors in the
sphere of fiscal policy and debt management. These problems played a huge
role in the Baring crash of 1891 and, again, in the Argentine crash of 2001
(della Paolera and Taylor 2003).
4.1.4. Public debt and the degree of openness and the direction of
international trade
In a seminal paper Tomz (2001) analyses whether it is the threat of
punishment or rather the desire to preserve reputation that prompts debtor
countries to repay. Tomz states that traditionally, it has been argued that
potential trade threats have compelled countries to honour their debts.
Creditors could use a variety of threats to persuade debtors to pay, such as
seizure of foreign assets, denial of short-term credit, or trade embargoes.
One by one, the author rejects the arguments based on punishment. In
this work, he builds a case study based on the Argentine experience during
the 1930s when the country was almost the sole Latin American country still
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honouring its debt service payments. He notes that there was no correlation
between commercial dependence and debt repayment. Given that the United
Kingdom was then Argentina’s main trade partner, the traditional debt-trade
argument implies that the country should prioritise payment to the United
Kingdom. However, in the 1930s debt issued in the United States represented
about 60 per cent of the total Argentine sovereign debt, and the debt in
British pounds a mere 37 per cent. Yet Argentina respected full service
payments on both accounts even when the U.S.-based debt was more
expensive than the United Kingdom one.
At another level, in terms of political economy, the argument goes that
should the trade-debt link hold, this would imply a consistent lobby by
exporters against default. Yet Tomz finds that this is not exactly what hap-
pened in Argentine public debate. Rather, key legislators from cattle raising
districts in the most important export-oriented provinces of Buenos Aires
and Santa Fe, actually endorsed default. Finally, he concludes that even
politicians claimed that reputation was the main reason to maintain debt
service payments, apparently displaying some kind of far-sighted vision of
the country’s future (Tomz 2001, pp. 19-20).
5. A SNAPSHOT OF SOVEREIGN DEBT MARKET DISRUPTIONS
The above vignettes illustrate the many «imperfections» of the sovereign
debt institutional context. Consequently, an important question arises about
the manifestation and resolution of sovereign debt crises. Absent a strong
international legal and contractual context that could enforce the promises
of the young nations to honour their debts, what was the Latin American
experience regarding the strategic behaviour of borrowers and lenders? We
identify four major lessons in the historical record:
1. Outright repudiation or refinancing? — In the wave of the 1820s, the
main nations of Brazil (subject to the caveat noted earlier), Chile,
Mexico, Peru, Gran Colombia, Federation of Central America and
the Province of Buenos Aires (which seceded in the 1820s from the
Argentine Confederation) all defaulted between 1826 and 1828. They
had issued their sovereign bonds in the early 1820s, some tried to
renegotiate but, with the exception of Brazil’s brief moratorium, most of
them could only restructure their situation by the 1850s. The situation of
most of them, except for the Mexican and Venezuelan cases, were
regularised no later than the 1870s, with arrangements that capitalised
interest and amortisation arrears. Although repayment was often very
delayed, in this first wave there were no cases of outright repudiation.
In between the two waves, for the period 1850-1873, the approximate
total of outstanding foreign loans to Latin America was £140 million — but
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45 per cent of this stock was simply devoted to refinancing the defaults
of the 1820s, as shown in Table 5. Later, after the crisis of 1873, which
saw a massive fall in the price of commodities, eight Latin American
countries defaulted as shown in Table 6, but most of them restructured
in the decade of the 1880s with the exception of Honduras, which was in
a perennial situation of default and was one of the few cases where the
gunboat policy was applied in 1905-1907.
The case of Mexico deserves special attention here. It had the most
extended period of default running from 1828 through 1888. By 1827-
1828 Mexico stopped coupon payments on the bonds and in spite of
successive attempts with successive Mexican governments, it was not
TABLE 5
FOREIGN LOANS TO LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS, 1850-1873
Purpose (%)
Country Total no.
of loans
Nominal value
(thousands of pounds)
Military Public
works
Refinance
Argentina 7 13,488 20 68 12
Bolivia 1 1,700 100 0
Brazil 8 23,467 30 13 57
Chile 7 8,502 37 51 12
Colombia 2 2,200 9 91
Costa Ria 3 3,400 100 0
Ecuador 1 1,824 100
Guatemala 2 650 77 23
Haiti 1 1,458 100
Honduras 4 5,590 98 2
Mexcio 2 16,960 70 30
Paraguay 2 3,000 80 20
Peru 7 51,840 10 45 45
Santo Domingo 1 757 100 0
Uruguay 1 3,500 100
Venezuela 2 2,500 30 70
Combined subtotals by subperiods
1850-1859 9 10,862 32 68
1860-1869 20 56,705 41 12 47
1870-1875 22 73,270 60 40
Source: Marichal (1989, p. 80).
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until 1888 with President Porfirio Dı´az that the country worked out a
complete scheme of financial readjustment to settle all early foreign
loans. Before settling, virtually everything was attempted to regain access
to capital markets, even an unusual debt-for-land swap offered to British
bondholders. Finally in 1888, an amount equivalent to 12.2 million
pounds was restructured and the haircut taken by the investors was
estimated at 81 per cent13.
In the case of Peru, after the guano boom evaporated, the scheme to
restructure the debt was a debt-for-concessions swap (the Grace Contract)
TABLE 6
DEFAULTS AND SETTLEMENTS OF LATIN AMERICAN LOAN FOLLOWING THE
CRISIS OF 1873
Government
defaulting
Interest
rate (%)
Original
date of issue
of loans
Nominal value
of unredeemed
principal
Date of
default Settlement
Bolivia 6 1872 1,654 1/1/1875 1880
Costa Rica 6 1871 940 1/11/1874 1885
7 1872 2,362 1/4/1874 1885
Guatemala 5 1856 73 1/2/1875 1882/1887
6 1869 469 1/4/1875 1882/1887
Honduras 5 1856 79 1/4/1873 Still in default
10 1867 901 1/1/1873 by turn of the
7 1869 2,177 1/3/1873
century
10 1870 2,243 1/1/1873
Paraguay 8 1871 957 15/6/1874 1885
8 1872 548 1/7/1874 1885
Peru 5 1869 265 1/1/1876 1890
6 1870 11,142 1/1/1876 1890
5 1872 21,547 1/1/1876 1890
Santo Domingo 6 1869 714 1/1/1873 1888
Uruguay 6 1871 3,165 1/8/1876 1879
Source: Marichal (1989, p. 120).
13 Preliminary estimations done by Kaminsky and Vega-Garcı´a (2012), in which the haircut is
defined as the percentage difference between the net present value of the old instruments and the
new instruments negotiated; a high loss incurred by the investors via the haircut means a high
degree of debt relief.
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for which the agreement meant the cancellation of all the foreign debts
(principal and interest) in exchange for guano, concession of the whole
national railways system for 66 years, and concessions of land (Vizcarra
2009; Kaminsky and Vega-Garcı´a 2012). Hence, we can see that most
countries were eager, and have used even heterodox mechanisms, to try
to restructure their debts and resume service when they could take
advantage of renewed liquidity in global capital markets.
2. A case of early default, resumption and restructuring — The Baring loan
of 1822 to the Province of Buenos Aires is an interesting example of a
situation where a default is a direct consequence of political economy
events — in this case, the ongoing war with Brazil from 1825 until
1828, which had a drastic consequences on internal monetary and
fiscal institutions. Buenos Aires tried to maintain service on the
London loan until 1827, in spite of a depreciation of the domestic
paper currency of 220 per cent in the 1825-1827 period (Bordo and
Ve´gh 2002). In early January 1828, the Times stated: «the dividendsy
will not be paid. That government (Buenos Aires) is unable to ship
specie due to a blockade, and exchange was so unfavorable, that had
the alternative of remitting bills been resorted to the government
would have had to raise four dollars for everyone paid to the English
creditor. But the war is wasting the resources of the countryy They
rely on another British loan, which they will never get» (Peters 1934,
p. 18). What was then the behaviour of Juan Manual de Rosas, the
Governor who ruled the Province from 1830 to 1852? Did he resume
payments or did he entertain a strategy of partial repayments?
While Rosas took a unilateral position of default, he always
maintained a position to resume payments. In 1842, interestingly
enough, he offered a debt for land swap by offering the Malvinas
Islands to Barings as a partial settlement, an offer that was rejected. In
1844, he started to pay a partial monthly installment until a definitive
settlement could take place. The government that succeeded Rosas —
and which reunited the province of Buenos Aires with the Argentine
Confederation — proposed a consensual restructuring to Barings and
initially doubled the monthly installment accepted by Rosas. In 1857,
Argentina assumed and consolidated the full principal and the
capitalisation of interest arrears along the lines of a previous Chilean
restructuring in 1842. The Argentina restructuring of 1857 implied the
issue of a new bond amounting to £1,641,000 to cover exactly for the
arrears of interest on the outstanding £970,000 debt. Principal
remained at par and there was a 2-year grace period for debt service.
However, coupons were lowered from the original 6 per cent to just
3 per cent per annum.
Interestingly enough, both in the cases of Chile (a span of 18 years
of outright default) and Argentina (a period of 16 years of outright
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default and 13 years of a unilateral partial repayment scheme), the
debt restructurings did not include any new money schemes. While in
both cases, the principal amount in nominal values was maintained,
because Chile resumed payments much earlier than Argentina, and
because the Argentina coupon rate was cut in half, the Chilean
investors suffered a considerably lower haircut: an estimated 44 per
cent vs. an estimated 73 per cent for the Argentine case (Kaminsky
and Vega-Garcı´a 2012; Table 4).
3. Early modern bail-outs in sovereign debt episodes after the boom of the
1880s: a bad 1891 Funding Loan Agreement — In the period 1880s-
1890s Argentina alone was the recipient of 30 per cent of the total
Latin American Foreign loans followed distantly by Brazil with 14 per
cent of total foreign loans inflows to Latin America, as shown in
Table 7. It is no surprise, then, that when Argentina started to reveal
by the end of 1890 that it would have problems servicing its foreign
debt, a panic arose in London and means were sought to avoid a
contagion in the event of an Argentine default.
This event became famously known as the Baring Crash of 1890-
1891. To avoid an all across the board default by Argentina, the Bank
of England coordinated a rescue operation in January 1891 that
involved a syndicate of merchant banks providing a «stand-by» loan of
£15 million, a «6 per cent funding loan», to cover the full service of the
external debt over three years for the Argentine Republic Bonds. Also,
this arrangement known as the «de la Plaza–Bank of England»
agreement included very harsh and contractionary conditionality
measures. Yet, in spite of the stabilisation reform efforts, the package
failed in 1892 to bring in a sustainable inter-temporal path of the debt
service and principal payments for Argentina. The real yield at which the
funding loan was floated was 16 per cent at a time of recession when the
debt-output ratio rose from 72 per cent to 91 per cent. (Curiously
enough, the conditions closely match the Argentina MegaSwap of
TABLE 7
FOREIGN LOANS OF FIVE LATIN AMERICAN STATES, 1880-1890
Country No. of loans Nominal value (thousands of pounds)
Argentina 50 77,985
Brazil 8 38,914
Chile 4 9,525
Mexico 5 21,850
Uruguay 4 18,782
Note: These five states received close to 90% of the total Latin American foreign loans in this decade.
SOVEREIGN DEBT IN LATIN AMERICA, 1820-1913
Revista de Historia Econo´mica, Journal of lberian and Latin American Economic History 211
May/June 2001 that was also effected at a yield rate of 16 per cent while
the rate of growth of the economy was 22 per cent.) In fact, the burden
of the debt increased for the recipient country, and the estimated haircut
was of about 29 per cent, which meant that the underwriters would
«expect» an even bigger transfer of resources from Argentina.
This also points to an alternative and quite different explanation for
the Baring crash built on the microeconomic market structure involving
the lenders to the country. Flores (2011) in a compelling paper argues
that this potential explanation is not a surprising one if one addresses the
microeconomic structure of the lending process to Argentina. In this
view the overborrowing of Argentina occurs exactly in the period
(1886-1889) of fiscal and macroeconomic deterioration, which gives
support to his view that the underwriting market structure could worsen
the overborrowing or «irrational exuberance» phenomena. That is to say,
the Baring’s branding was in some way «cannibalized» by the entry of
less reputed financial houses. Curiously enough, to clean up this mess,
a debt forgiveness package was proposed by J. J. Romero in 1893 to a
Committee of Creditors headed by the House of Rothschild, the most
reliable underwriter in the sovereign lending business, leading to a
successful resolution (della Paolera and Taylor 2001, pp. 106-117).
Argentina’s so-called Romero agreement of 1893 stated that, between
1893 and 1898 the national government would pay half the level of
original debt service recognised in the de la Plaza-Bank of England
agreement, then from 1898 onwards it would pay the full level of debt
service, and finally from 1901 the government would begin to amortise
principal on the National Sovereign Bonds. Therefore, the Argentine
Republic Bonds were never «technically» in default, but they avoided
default only by two sequential restructuring attempts. It is important to
notice here that the Provincial and Municipal bonds were in default
since 1891 and that the federal government was eventually to nationalise
those obligations as late as 1898. Though foreign direct investment was
not halted completely, Argentina grew slowly as an austere fiscal and
monetary regime was imposed until they rejoined the gold standard in
1899; the government could only float new money bonds (i.e., not
rollovers/refinancings) again in 1901 so, while foreign direct investment
in the private sector gradually recovered, the public sector was in
virtually in financial autarky for almost a decade.
6. CONCLUSION
Latin America may always be the greatest historical laboratory for the
analysis and understanding of sovereign debt and default. Its long post-
independence history, its early embrace of external debt, and its persistent
political and macroeconomic volatility have meant that for 200 years the
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countries of the region have confronted hard choices about the optimal path
of debt, repayments and restructurings.
Seeking an analytic narrative, this paper takes the region’s 19th-century
history as a backdrop and aims to integrate the well-known narrative con-
tours of this sovereign debt and default experience with contemporary
research in economic theory and quantitative evidence from econometric
analysis. At a macro level, the natural neoclassical «downhill» flow of capital
to the region generally went in the expected direction on average. But the
tendency of these flows to clump in great surges, followed by retrenchments
and often sovereign defaults, commands further explanations. In many cases
economic fundamentals mattered (e.g., the rise and fall of guano prospects)
but political conditions played a large role (especially before 1860, with
Brazil being the exception that proved the rule). Contagion is apparent in
some cases, as when the Baring crisis spread far and wide beyond the River
Plate economies. And at a microeconomic level, the effects of imperfect
information and market structure, and hence the role of intermediaries,
cannot be discounted. As early as the 1820s bad information was a vehicle for
simple fraud but even decades later asymmetries remained.
These findings have echoes in the emerging world at present, as in Latin
America (and even in the so-called advanced countries, taking into account
Eurozone fiscal and banking union tensions). As in 1800, the world lacks a
sovereign bankruptcy procedure, and may for some time, so the occurrence
and resolution of sovereign default problems remain: witness the Argentine
2002 default still as it still wends its way through U.S. courts. But absent such
fundamental changes, history warns that next time is unlikely to be different,
and external debt flows of the future may continue to be at risk of the exu-
berance, collapse, default and resolution problems of old. If that is the road
ahead, then Latin America will continue to be a useful reference map.
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